Line Item Veto Power favors a Strong Presidency; thus, it is Inimical to a Stable Federal Republic

One always wonder why appropriation of public funds requires de facto approval by the Philippine chief executive.

If we are to be reminded of the past, lawmakers were once called "tongressmen" for being morbidly corrupt. Virtuous rule by a statesmanlike figure such as former President Cory Aquino ensured that such lawmakers were kept under leash or so help us, they would spend public money like there is no tomorrow.

Unfortunately, her reign did not last, as provided for by the Philippine Constitution. Chief executives after her were accused of corruption while one even got convicted of plundering the nation's wealth.

Without a doubt, what was once an office that ensured adherence to the law has become the very office which became the source of patronage, corruption, and utter disregard for the rule of law.

Therefore, the time has come for the executive branch to be reined in.

If the executive branch is to be kept under leash, one must abolish or remove the constitutional power which perpetuate and reinforce executive dominance in terms of appropriating public funds.

That executive prerogative is called "line item veto."

In the hands of a chief executive that adheres to the rule of law, a line item veto is a tool to be reckoned with, especially in terms of legislative excesses. Nonetheless, in the hands of an ignoramus or a shrewd and corrupt chief executive, such power is extremely dangerous; indeed, line item veto had become the chief executive's threat to a particular legislator's pork barrel fund, a legislator whose crucial vote may determine the success of a pending bill beneficial to the chief executive.

If the line item veto is the chief executive's leash to a corrupt legislator's public spending, what on earth can hinder the chief executive from using such veto power to influence a fellow corrupt legislator from voting the chief executive's way? What constitutional restriction could stop a corrupt chief executive from threatening a particular legislator's (perhaps even legitimate) pet projects with a line item veto, unless the legislator kowtow to the chief executive's whim?

As of current, none.

Line item veto is an executive power that is beyond the reach of the system of checks and balances enshrined in the Philippine Constitution. The very essence of a line item veto power negates the use of (1) normal veto, (2) congressional 2/3 override of presidential veto (as explained by the long absence of (1) and (2) in congressional journals), and it (3) discourages other legislators from reconsidering the entire bill, as long as their proposed "line items" remain intact in the final draft.

It allows the rejection of hidden, unaccounted, and rushed appropriations; thus, it prevents abuse; but it also enables the rejection of clauses, or perhaps, even words that are vital to the interpretation and implementation of a bill, making the proposed bill "toothless" and thus, a watered down version.

Indeed, I dare say that line item veto is the most efficient form of the executive's power to check legislative excesses.

But the consequence of such efficiency is the very destruction of the separation of powers among the branches of government.

Fot it allows the chief executive to wield tremendous "power of the purse," that is, the power to micromanage the time and manner public money is spent. No wonder, the Philippine Media is used to the notion that the Office of the President or the Department of Budget and Management appropriates, gives, hands out or releases public funds. Hello! The key to the treasury is kept by Congress, if no one has noticed!

Indeed, such veto is a tool that, when used for good, can effectively check legislative misappropriation; but when used for bad, can slyly supersede accountability and transparency vital to a government under the rule of law.

For this reason, I propose that the line item veto power of the chief executive be stricken from the letter of the Philippine Constitution.

In consequence thereof, I also recommend the inclusion of a pocket veto in the amended charter, right before congressional adjournment or recess, to give additional flexibility to the chief executive and his ability to restrain what may be considered bad legislation.

One must also point out that the chief executive has not been completely disarmed by removing that specific kind of veto power. Normal veto remains intact, and it is sufficient to counter legislative abuses.

As an example, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Philippine Constitution is explicit in the sense that the previous year's budget appropriations can roll over to the next until a new appropriations bill is passed by Congress. If the legislative branch exceeded its appropriation authority (by going beyond the proposed budget of the chief executive (Philippine Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [1]), then the chief executive may use normal veto in order to fulfill his constitutional duty of checking legislative over-appropriation.

More so, the Constitution requires the chief executive to explain his "objections" to Congress (Article VI Section 27 [1], second sentence); perhaps, the best way to publicly rebuke those who proposed to increase the budget beyond congressional authority would be to explain as to why he objected, such as a lavish pork barrel spending.

If Congress insists that such legislation is passed, it is arguable that the chief executive can appeal to the public through the press before such legislation is passed over his veto, which in political lingo translates to a threat of failed incumbencies hanging over the heads of those legislators, leaving to the people to decide whether such legislation is appropriate in their judgment.