In a democracy, certain officials of the state were granted the power to appoint officials in the name of practicality and expediency. Elected officials are mandated to nominate, confirm, and then appoint other officials because it is unthinkable for the whole citizenry to do so. Hence, representative democracy was born in modern times. However, the relationship between the pursuit of accountability and efficiency are quite inverse: the more wants to have accountability the more one should less expect quick decision making.
This is the dilemma at the heart of the Commission of Appointment. As demanded by accountability, thorough scrutiny of the bureaucracy, appointed officials, and government acts require extensive deliberations and considerable time on policymaking while smooth and quick implementation of public policies and confirmation of officials are necessary for the proper functioning of government. The compromise then was the creation of a special commission within the legislative branch, specifically tasked on approving nominations made by the chief executive.
But the problem with this commission is its exclusive nature. Even though half of the Senate is represented and an equal number is reserved for House members, the commission neither carry the popular and institutional legitimacy which the House or the Senate enjoys nor is it representative enough given that a commission with so few members represent the entire mandate of the people to confirm to their offices essential officers of the state.
The fact that in Philippine politics appointed officials frequently state that they were "serving under the leisure of the President" (thus, disregard legislative confirmation on the appointment of government officials ) serves to give notice to our legislators how limited the view of appointed officials regarding the appointment process; it also shows the importance of having either the upper or lower House, voting as a whole, to confirm the officers of the state and thus have a recognizable stake in their appointment.
Thus, in the name of legitimacy and expediency, I suggest transferring to a particular legislative branch, voting as a whole, which will have the least number of members (the Senate perhaps) in the amended 1987 Constitution the full responsibility of confirming nominated candidates. The trick here is persuading the other House that their powers will not diminish even if such House does not participate in confirming potential officers of the state. That such powers were only exclusively due to the speed which a single legislative body with fewer members can possibly provide, without having to sacrifice the institutional legitimacy it can confer, must be emphasized. Perhaps it should be also argued that the there are some powers that are exclusive to each House and such delegation was determined by their function, without prejudice to the co-equal essence of each house.
Or if the other House is not open to curtailing their confirming power, have the two Houses, voting as a whole, make the confirmation of nominated individuals a congressional priority, with a newly created appointment committees on each House making the crucial recommendation.
This is the dilemma at the heart of the Commission of Appointment. As demanded by accountability, thorough scrutiny of the bureaucracy, appointed officials, and government acts require extensive deliberations and considerable time on policymaking while smooth and quick implementation of public policies and confirmation of officials are necessary for the proper functioning of government. The compromise then was the creation of a special commission within the legislative branch, specifically tasked on approving nominations made by the chief executive.
But the problem with this commission is its exclusive nature. Even though half of the Senate is represented and an equal number is reserved for House members, the commission neither carry the popular and institutional legitimacy which the House or the Senate enjoys nor is it representative enough given that a commission with so few members represent the entire mandate of the people to confirm to their offices essential officers of the state.
The fact that in Philippine politics appointed officials frequently state that they were "serving under the leisure of the President" (thus, disregard legislative confirmation on the appointment of government officials ) serves to give notice to our legislators how limited the view of appointed officials regarding the appointment process; it also shows the importance of having either the upper or lower House, voting as a whole, to confirm the officers of the state and thus have a recognizable stake in their appointment.
Thus, in the name of legitimacy and expediency, I suggest transferring to a particular legislative branch, voting as a whole, which will have the least number of members (the Senate perhaps) in the amended 1987 Constitution the full responsibility of confirming nominated candidates. The trick here is persuading the other House that their powers will not diminish even if such House does not participate in confirming potential officers of the state. That such powers were only exclusively due to the speed which a single legislative body with fewer members can possibly provide, without having to sacrifice the institutional legitimacy it can confer, must be emphasized. Perhaps it should be also argued that the there are some powers that are exclusive to each House and such delegation was determined by their function, without prejudice to the co-equal essence of each house.
Or if the other House is not open to curtailing their confirming power, have the two Houses, voting as a whole, make the confirmation of nominated individuals a congressional priority, with a newly created appointment committees on each House making the crucial recommendation.
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