Institution V. Person, the Office V. the Law, Constitutional V. Common Good

“I emphasized that more than anything, loyalty has to be to the institution, to the flag, to the Constitution, and not to any single person or personal interest.”

--- Philippine President Benigno C. Aquino III, Speech during the AFP Chief of Staff Change of Command


Personal Institutions

Articles with emphasis on the person loves to mention the "Arroyo Administration," as opposed to the "Executive Branch," "Executive Department (as stated in the Constitution)," "the administration," or even "the executive." I suppose being provocative in this case means more attention and marketability of news articles.

Thank you for that, journalists.

Mindsets convinced of the personal nature of government appropriations would allow the thought of "hihingi ako kay (Gov't Position + Official's Name) ng pondo para..." without acknowledging the institutional safeguards entreched in the processes of releasing public funds created to prevent imbalance and thus abuse of power.

Government projects and offices named after certain individuals. Integrating personal names into public development projects in a consistent fashion ingrain, "makes it okay," and brainwash the public mind in accepting the extent of institutional weakness of public institutions.

Importance of Office and Official vis-a-vis the Processes of the Law

The recent SC decision on the appointment of the Chief Justice (CJ) during an election period, its constitutionality notwithstanding, emphasizes: (1) the primus inter pares principle holds little sway given the crucial functions of the CJ; (2) the notion that the SC is unable to function as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) without its supposed "Chair."

Primus Inter Pares, in this instance, meant "the only one among lesser equals" as opposed to "first among equals." Without the CJ, the institution of the PET (SC), will cease to function as sole arbiter of presidential election issues and thus grind to a halt.

Indeed, it gives momentum to the notion that the CJ is not "among equals" but literally above other Justices, whose equality arises on the equal value of votes on SC decisions alone.

Here, one sees the utmost disregard for the processes of the law. Not only was the constitutional ban on appointments surrounding the election period ignored, but the law governing the assumption of the Acting CJ trampled upon.

Relying on judicial review without clear, convincing and established precedence, the process set forth by law with regard to the vacancy of the Office of the CJ has been substantially ignored; the majority opinion, overwhelming to say the least, clearly disregarded explicit provisions of lawful succession within the SC. Hence, the decision began establishing the perception that the Office of the CJ is more crucial than the succession (as established by law) in itself.

In congressional terms, lawmakers are more important than the law, because without lawmakers, there is no law. But how did the lawmakers become lawmakers without the "Supreme Law of the Land?"

The framers ought to have considered that the nation must not be held hostage just because of the failure to fill up the vacancy of the Office of the CJ. Learn from the executive branch. Follow the law of succession even if it is just a mere Republic Act. Where a precedent is absent, congressional acts, if they exist, must prevail upon judicial review without precedent.

The SC as an institution, and its members: the Justices and the CJ, must always be reminded that they are not policymakers, but interpreters. The judiciary answers questions of law and constitutional issues, not bark commands or orders, issue mandates and make laws.

Even if allowed to do so, such commands or orders must be based on established rules, which in turn, must be based on precedent or publicy policy crafted by policymakers. The Justices are jurists of the last resort; policy emanates from the representatives of the People, that is, Congress and the presidency.

I suppose in a country which does not emphasize the rule of law, but instead make persons in public office supreme (no pun intended) i.e. above the law, it is to be normally expected.

No wonder, the constitutional power of the SC seems "vested" in the Office of the CJ alone. Ergo, the SC is none other than the CJ. Leadership in a collegial body, an institution were the majority of member peers decide the fate of millions, ought not to depend on a single office whose absence creates dire consequences to the proper functioning of the SC, let alone to the interpretation of the letter and spirit of the laws.

Thank you, Filipino Supremes, for emphasizing that the OFFICE IS MORE SACRED THAN THE LAW, which makes officials "official."

Perhaps, a proposal where Justices of the SC will rotate on a consistent and timely basis (similar to the Swiss Federal Council) to fill up the position of the CJ is the answer to the imbalance of an overbearing office which dilutes the credibility and primacy of the SC as a collective and collegial institution.

This proposal, however imperfect it may be, gives solution to: (1) dependence to the Office of the CJ, especially during trying times and special exigencies, (2) prevention of what proponents believe as dilemmas caused by the vacancy of the Office of the CJ (whatever that may be) and (3) the full realization and return of the SC as a collegial body, a group of peers whose collective opinion decides the constitutional and legal questions of the Filipino nation.

Constitutional V. What is Good for the Nation

Does the SC tackle the issue of "what is good for the nation?" or what is constitutional? What if the two opposes each other? If it is unconstitutional for foreign ownership to exist in the Philippines, would "what is good for the nation" prevail?
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