I wish to express my condolences to the family of the victims of the Maguindanao Massacre.
I hope that their deaths would not have been in vain; by all that I hold dear, I shall try to give justice to those who subscribes to the principles of democracy, even at the risk of their own lives.
There are no words, no language too aggressive, no description so near to embody the utter disregard for human life.
It was a classic case of the madness that envelop men in their pursuit, desire and hunger to perpetuate their hold on power by any means and at all costs.
It is base evil. Relative or not, friend or foe, beloved or hated, whosoever subcribes to this kind of politics shall suffer the wrath of my tongue. I pray it remains sharp at all times.
One of the purposes of this blog was to criticize actions that would encourage and lead to this barbaric act, and deconstruct the operating mindset of the perpetrators who deserve the fullest application of due process of the law.
We shall teach this ignorant fools that the time for political clans in the Philippines is about to end.
We must also hold accountable a lousy and ineffective national government, an administration who benefitted from its alliance with this clan in term of votes in their favor. They too stand condemned.
The Philippines stands on trial in the court of world opinion, the international community has issued its strongest condemnation and the Philippines is again the most dangerous country on earth for journalist.
And to add salt to the wound, the stupidity with which the perpetrators have committed extends to immeasurable heights.
The party was escorted by representatives from the media and non-governmental organizations to ensure the safety of those who wish to enter the elections and thus defy the established political clans.
The contempt which these clans have to our democratic processes is beyond account.
If not for divine command and the rule of law, had I the strength to make them account, I would have used the Roman way of punishing these lawbreakers and disruptors of society's order.
I'll hang them to a pole and exposed them to the elements, shame them until they have no more desire for life, and feed their carcasses to the circling vultures... death to those who do not fear the law, those who seek to destroy our democratic way of life and those who have no regard for human life.
Since they do not hold life as dear, their lives are, by justice, forfeit and thus do not deserve to see the light of day.
We are watching you, the Philippine national government. Take each step carefully or you may end up liable for your inability to bring to justice your allies, however former they may be.
~
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Anti-Corruption Month Bill is a Waste of Time; Instead, Support the Decriminalization of Libel or Reduce fines of Lèse Majesté Laws
Trivialities
There is one Congress of the Philippines and what do we see in the news? Lawmakers wasting their time on trivialities instead of taking action.
Declaring October as Anti-Corruption Month? Why just October? Why not, "♪ Enero, Febrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo, Hulyo, Agosto, Setyembre, Oktobre, Nobyembre, Disyembre, Lubi-Lubi ♪!"
Why not all 12 months?! You really make me laugh.
Has it become a typical pastime of lawmakers to declare months as this and that? Do you not have other important matters to attend to? Leave those blasted declarations to the Executive Branch and pass bills of crucial importance such as Agrarian Reform, Judicial Compensation Reform, Presidential Succession, Taxation Reform, and amendments to the Labor and Omnibus Election Code (to name a few)!
Why do you waste precious deliberation time on such petty matter?
Baloney
The premise that declaring October as an Anti-Corruption Month, and mandating "all heads of government agencies and instrumentalities to conduct activities that promote public awareness" will help the Filipino people become "informed and vigilant" citizens is absolute baloney.
Let me be clear on this: the bill will mandate government officials who refuse to acknowledge, apathetic to, and involved in corruption to act as fountains of virtue? More so, the same group of people will create programs to INSTRUCT the citizenry on how not to be corrupt?
Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha!
Are you out of your mind?
IT IS BETTER TO ASK ROBBERS AND THIEVES TO TEACH THEIR VICTIMS NOT TO STEAL THAN PASS SUCH LAW, DIMWIT!
Why It does not Work that Way
The passage of such trivial laws testifies to the ineptness of some of the members of the government institution in which the Philippine Constitution granted considerable power and authority.
More so, it reveals the flaw of a political tradition that extols virtuous rule, a way of political thinking which have governed their lives since before they were born.
To a people under such condition, politicians with the best moral background are best to rule. Once politicians turn "corrupt," the people seek the next "good" politician to lead the nation.
Well, a republican democracy that does not work that way. The principle of checks and balances through the separation of powers only works if the fundamental premise revolves around the belief that all politicians are ambitious and self-seeking.
Ergo, a politican's incessant desire for fame and status ought to be contained by public censure; their hunger for wealth and fear of losing the ability to "have more" must be by discouraged by the putrid smells and crampness of Philippine jails; and their thirst to maintain and seek power regardless of the consequence must be quenched by the fear of losing it.
And only citizens that participate on our democratic processes, who demands that their voices be heard, who ensures that each and every politician is held accountable for his action can make these things happen.
Individuals whose mouthpiece and usual thought are, cooperation is key, criticism makes it worse and this politician can be good usually carry the disease of being more of a CONSUMER OR CUSTOMER BUT NOT A CITIZEN.
They (those consumers & customers) carry the disease of transferring all political responsibilities in the hands of politicians (a precursor to and tendency of aristocracy). Trusting in the supposed "goodness" of politicians they elected, they surrender their membership in the public realm, making them individuals incapable of assuming the burden and duty of citizenship.
Those individuals are no better than slaves whose lives are governed by the pleasure that the fruits of their labor produce and the things that their hands have made: a constant cycle of never-ending toil and happiness based upon their material creation.
Support the Decriminalization of Libel or Reduce fines of Lèse Majesté Laws
If one is really serious in attempting to reign in corruption, then one must allow the highest realization of accountability.
Dear lawmaker, if indeed you really wish the reduction of corruption, if not its elimination, then promote transparency by removing barriers imposed by lèse majesté, a concept devoid of democratic foundations, and hiding in the guise of and protected by libel laws.
Tyrants, ancient, medieval, and modern, abuse its use to justify their repressive acts to the detriment of liberty, freedom of expression and speech.
As James Madison, one of the architects of the concept of Checks and Balances through the Separation of Powers Principle, the political theory in which the federal government of the United States is based, surmised, the greatest threat to government abuse and indiscretion (i.e., corruption) is an effective system in which each government branch can mind each other's business.
But who shall mind the branches of government, beyond each other? And the entire government, who shall hold it accountable?
That prerogative remains, my dear lawmakers, as always, in the hands of and forever belongs to the Filipino people, your Sovereign.
Having no difference from stripping citizens of their inherent right to scrutinize government acts, libel laws discourage accountability in the form of speech acts by citizens (however politically correct they may be) such as internet & newspaper articles, blogs, etc.
Politicians should not be afraid of any kind of media if it is not based on facts, unless Philippine politicians think that the Filipino people are idiots and cannot distinguish lies from truth.
By actively doing nothing to amend Philippine lèse majesté laws, you protect government officials who commit graft and corruption, and become one of the corrupt. By turning a blind eye on the effects of this draconian law to freedom of speech, you become part of the problem, not of the solution.
Do not think we are not watching. Sovereign power belongs to the people. It would do you, politicians, well to remember that.
~
There is one Congress of the Philippines and what do we see in the news? Lawmakers wasting their time on trivialities instead of taking action.
Declaring October as Anti-Corruption Month? Why just October? Why not, "♪ Enero, Febrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo, Hulyo, Agosto, Setyembre, Oktobre, Nobyembre, Disyembre, Lubi-Lubi ♪!"
Why not all 12 months?! You really make me laugh.
Has it become a typical pastime of lawmakers to declare months as this and that? Do you not have other important matters to attend to? Leave those blasted declarations to the Executive Branch and pass bills of crucial importance such as Agrarian Reform, Judicial Compensation Reform, Presidential Succession, Taxation Reform, and amendments to the Labor and Omnibus Election Code (to name a few)!
Why do you waste precious deliberation time on such petty matter?
Baloney
The premise that declaring October as an Anti-Corruption Month, and mandating "all heads of government agencies and instrumentalities to conduct activities that promote public awareness" will help the Filipino people become "informed and vigilant" citizens is absolute baloney.
Let me be clear on this: the bill will mandate government officials who refuse to acknowledge, apathetic to, and involved in corruption to act as fountains of virtue? More so, the same group of people will create programs to INSTRUCT the citizenry on how not to be corrupt?
Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha!
Are you out of your mind?
IT IS BETTER TO ASK ROBBERS AND THIEVES TO TEACH THEIR VICTIMS NOT TO STEAL THAN PASS SUCH LAW, DIMWIT!
Why It does not Work that Way
The passage of such trivial laws testifies to the ineptness of some of the members of the government institution in which the Philippine Constitution granted considerable power and authority.
More so, it reveals the flaw of a political tradition that extols virtuous rule, a way of political thinking which have governed their lives since before they were born.
To a people under such condition, politicians with the best moral background are best to rule. Once politicians turn "corrupt," the people seek the next "good" politician to lead the nation.
Well, a republican democracy that does not work that way. The principle of checks and balances through the separation of powers only works if the fundamental premise revolves around the belief that all politicians are ambitious and self-seeking.
Ergo, a politican's incessant desire for fame and status ought to be contained by public censure; their hunger for wealth and fear of losing the ability to "have more" must be by discouraged by the putrid smells and crampness of Philippine jails; and their thirst to maintain and seek power regardless of the consequence must be quenched by the fear of losing it.
And only citizens that participate on our democratic processes, who demands that their voices be heard, who ensures that each and every politician is held accountable for his action can make these things happen.
Individuals whose mouthpiece and usual thought are, cooperation is key, criticism makes it worse and this politician can be good usually carry the disease of being more of a CONSUMER OR CUSTOMER BUT NOT A CITIZEN.
They (those consumers & customers) carry the disease of transferring all political responsibilities in the hands of politicians (a precursor to and tendency of aristocracy). Trusting in the supposed "goodness" of politicians they elected, they surrender their membership in the public realm, making them individuals incapable of assuming the burden and duty of citizenship.
Those individuals are no better than slaves whose lives are governed by the pleasure that the fruits of their labor produce and the things that their hands have made: a constant cycle of never-ending toil and happiness based upon their material creation.
Support the Decriminalization of Libel or Reduce fines of Lèse Majesté Laws
If one is really serious in attempting to reign in corruption, then one must allow the highest realization of accountability.
Dear lawmaker, if indeed you really wish the reduction of corruption, if not its elimination, then promote transparency by removing barriers imposed by lèse majesté, a concept devoid of democratic foundations, and hiding in the guise of and protected by libel laws.
Tyrants, ancient, medieval, and modern, abuse its use to justify their repressive acts to the detriment of liberty, freedom of expression and speech.
As James Madison, one of the architects of the concept of Checks and Balances through the Separation of Powers Principle, the political theory in which the federal government of the United States is based, surmised, the greatest threat to government abuse and indiscretion (i.e., corruption) is an effective system in which each government branch can mind each other's business.
But who shall mind the branches of government, beyond each other? And the entire government, who shall hold it accountable?
That prerogative remains, my dear lawmakers, as always, in the hands of and forever belongs to the Filipino people, your Sovereign.
Having no difference from stripping citizens of their inherent right to scrutinize government acts, libel laws discourage accountability in the form of speech acts by citizens (however politically correct they may be) such as internet & newspaper articles, blogs, etc.
Politicians should not be afraid of any kind of media if it is not based on facts, unless Philippine politicians think that the Filipino people are idiots and cannot distinguish lies from truth.
By actively doing nothing to amend Philippine lèse majesté laws, you protect government officials who commit graft and corruption, and become one of the corrupt. By turning a blind eye on the effects of this draconian law to freedom of speech, you become part of the problem, not of the solution.
Do not think we are not watching. Sovereign power belongs to the people. It would do you, politicians, well to remember that.
~
Sunday, October 4, 2009
Public Appropriations 101: Where to and not to Spend Public Money
In Philippines politics, one of the most bizarre phenomena (but also unabashedly common) amongst politicians is the appropriation of public money in things that has nothing to do with public expenditures.
But what is public expenditure? How does public expenditure differ from other "release of funds" from government coffers? Are there institutional mechanisms which must take place, processes to be followed, or approvals to be gained before public funds may be released?
Public expenditure is defined as money spent (or used) for the public good. Public good, on the other hand, refers to anything that benefits the public; it also pertains to acts performed on its behalf; examples are constructions of public infrastructures such as roads, bridges, and school buildings (to name a few); salaries of government employees because these employees provide crucial public service; it also includes local and national governments buying private property under just compensation provisions in the Philippine Constitution.
The bottomline of public expenditure is any government spending where the people is the exlusive beneficiary. The ones who appropriated the funds, the ones who hold the funds, and the ones who released public funds are NOT to benefit from it. No exemptions.
Government officials involved in the authorization of government spending may PRUDENTLY claim credit for being INSTRUMENTAL in releasing public funds to a certain extent; remember, appropriating public funds is your duty in the first place; it is not something to brag about because it is expected of you to do just that, nothing more. If one understands the meaning of the Tagalog word kawanggawa, I am sure one wuld not be foolish enough to consider it as "beyond the call of duty."
e.g., Events between Private & Public Schools
But what about spending on things that may be considered quasi-public good? Let us discuss, for example, graduation expenses in public schools. Parents are supposed to contribute money for the event; depending on how LAVISH the graduation ceremony would be, I must remind parents that their expectations must be equal to the amount of money they themselves will contribute.
It sounds fair, does it not?
The government ought not to collext taxes (and as far as I know, does not do so) to spend on expensive graduations and pageantries, taxes that could be better spent on books, class materials, and fixing dilapidated or building new school buildings.
Indeed, I have never heard that taxpayers money in the Philippines pay for graduation ceremonies and pageantries; PTAs are still in charge of gathering such sums from private donations. If those money came from government officials, then that is illegal especially if it came from government coffers.
I am sure I need not explain why graduation expenses in private schools have nothing to do with public spending. The circumstance is self-explanatory enough.
But what about in events where public and private schools are involved? In general, the amount of public spending for such occasion must be proportional to the level of participation by public schools. In an ideal setting, the extent of funding is primarily measured by the number of students with indigent status WHO CANNOT AFFORD to pay their contributions, that is, to the extent in which it is the case that no other source exists, but the government.
This means that parents with children in public schools who can afford contributions must do so.
Parents should not be uptight when it comes to contributing for the sake of their offsprings. After all, what would you not do for them? Do you not wish the best for your children? Then why do you, those who can afford to give, rely on government funds: funds that can be diverted away from those who are much in need than yourselves?
I find it strange that parents complain that there is not enough public funding during school events when they themselves can contribute. Of course, this does not apply to poor families, which public funding must obviously cover.
It is given that, even though public schools are open to anyone, it is more likely for families with low income earnings to send their children to public schools; hence, when events that involve private and public schools are held, public funding may be released TO A CERTAIN EXTENT; releasing public funds must be based on the number of indigent public school students participating.
Corruption
If one claims the government has enough funds and that corruption is the reason why there are not enough funds, then pray tell, when was the last time you scrutinized public funding by actually demanding from officials whom you elected how (in what manner) they spent public money?
Perhaps, you should ask elected officials when and where was it spent; or simply, where are the records for such spending?
Where could it be?
Since you claim that you knew there was corruption, WHY DID YOU NOT HOLD THEM ACCOUNTABLE? Even in petitioning the government to redress your grievances, are you so helpless that you cannot even make your voice heard?
Surely, having known corruption is the problem, one has tried to inquire and make them account? Or are you just plain cowards who keep your mouths shut in fear of those whom you elected?
Perhaps you deserve to be lied upon because you allow yourself to be lied upon.
THOU SHALL NOT of Public Spending
Public funds may not be used:
(1) for funerals unless (a) the person has contributed to the public good in a recurring or constant manner, (b) the name of the town / city / province / nation is acknowledged as the source of the tribute, not any elected or other government official. Elected and other government officials who wish to use their names may send their personal tributes in their own capacity, using their own money.
(2) for tarpaulins informing the public of publicly-funded programs and projects, which emphasize the face and name of elected officials than actual public information such as when a project will be completed, disruptions caused by such projects, or hours of a public program. Elected officials, local and national, ought to be ashamed that their faces are bigger than the information which the public must know. It becomes so obvious how corrupt a political culture of a certain country is, even with this simple but usually ignored signs.
More to come on the THOU SHALL NOT...
~
But what is public expenditure? How does public expenditure differ from other "release of funds" from government coffers? Are there institutional mechanisms which must take place, processes to be followed, or approvals to be gained before public funds may be released?
Public expenditure is defined as money spent (or used) for the public good. Public good, on the other hand, refers to anything that benefits the public; it also pertains to acts performed on its behalf; examples are constructions of public infrastructures such as roads, bridges, and school buildings (to name a few); salaries of government employees because these employees provide crucial public service; it also includes local and national governments buying private property under just compensation provisions in the Philippine Constitution.
The bottomline of public expenditure is any government spending where the people is the exlusive beneficiary. The ones who appropriated the funds, the ones who hold the funds, and the ones who released public funds are NOT to benefit from it. No exemptions.
Government officials involved in the authorization of government spending may PRUDENTLY claim credit for being INSTRUMENTAL in releasing public funds to a certain extent; remember, appropriating public funds is your duty in the first place; it is not something to brag about because it is expected of you to do just that, nothing more. If one understands the meaning of the Tagalog word kawanggawa, I am sure one wuld not be foolish enough to consider it as "beyond the call of duty."
e.g., Events between Private & Public Schools
But what about spending on things that may be considered quasi-public good? Let us discuss, for example, graduation expenses in public schools. Parents are supposed to contribute money for the event; depending on how LAVISH the graduation ceremony would be, I must remind parents that their expectations must be equal to the amount of money they themselves will contribute.
It sounds fair, does it not?
The government ought not to collext taxes (and as far as I know, does not do so) to spend on expensive graduations and pageantries, taxes that could be better spent on books, class materials, and fixing dilapidated or building new school buildings.
Indeed, I have never heard that taxpayers money in the Philippines pay for graduation ceremonies and pageantries; PTAs are still in charge of gathering such sums from private donations. If those money came from government officials, then that is illegal especially if it came from government coffers.
I am sure I need not explain why graduation expenses in private schools have nothing to do with public spending. The circumstance is self-explanatory enough.
But what about in events where public and private schools are involved? In general, the amount of public spending for such occasion must be proportional to the level of participation by public schools. In an ideal setting, the extent of funding is primarily measured by the number of students with indigent status WHO CANNOT AFFORD to pay their contributions, that is, to the extent in which it is the case that no other source exists, but the government.
This means that parents with children in public schools who can afford contributions must do so.
Parents should not be uptight when it comes to contributing for the sake of their offsprings. After all, what would you not do for them? Do you not wish the best for your children? Then why do you, those who can afford to give, rely on government funds: funds that can be diverted away from those who are much in need than yourselves?
I find it strange that parents complain that there is not enough public funding during school events when they themselves can contribute. Of course, this does not apply to poor families, which public funding must obviously cover.
It is given that, even though public schools are open to anyone, it is more likely for families with low income earnings to send their children to public schools; hence, when events that involve private and public schools are held, public funding may be released TO A CERTAIN EXTENT; releasing public funds must be based on the number of indigent public school students participating.
Corruption
If one claims the government has enough funds and that corruption is the reason why there are not enough funds, then pray tell, when was the last time you scrutinized public funding by actually demanding from officials whom you elected how (in what manner) they spent public money?
Perhaps, you should ask elected officials when and where was it spent; or simply, where are the records for such spending?
Where could it be?
Since you claim that you knew there was corruption, WHY DID YOU NOT HOLD THEM ACCOUNTABLE? Even in petitioning the government to redress your grievances, are you so helpless that you cannot even make your voice heard?
Surely, having known corruption is the problem, one has tried to inquire and make them account? Or are you just plain cowards who keep your mouths shut in fear of those whom you elected?
Perhaps you deserve to be lied upon because you allow yourself to be lied upon.
THOU SHALL NOT of Public Spending
Public funds may not be used:
(1) for funerals unless (a) the person has contributed to the public good in a recurring or constant manner, (b) the name of the town / city / province / nation is acknowledged as the source of the tribute, not any elected or other government official. Elected and other government officials who wish to use their names may send their personal tributes in their own capacity, using their own money.
(2) for tarpaulins informing the public of publicly-funded programs and projects, which emphasize the face and name of elected officials than actual public information such as when a project will be completed, disruptions caused by such projects, or hours of a public program. Elected officials, local and national, ought to be ashamed that their faces are bigger than the information which the public must know. It becomes so obvious how corrupt a political culture of a certain country is, even with this simple but usually ignored signs.
More to come on the THOU SHALL NOT...
~
Saturday, September 5, 2009
Politics of Personality VS. Issue-based Politics: The Media and its Trapo Tendencies
It is typical for Filipinos to believe that the answer to the everlasting disease of government corruption and rule of the popular (e.g., actors, offsprings of eminent figures, sport figures, etc.), the rich, and even the academicians is to elect a politician of virtuous quality, who will lead the country to a better future.
Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha!
Such naiveness deserves no less than the sting of reminding them, by hurtful words, that such person does not exist! "All fall short of His glory," as it is written.
Another vain fallacy that keeps me awake, short of laughing myself to the point of breathlessness, is the notion that the sons and daughters of proven benevolent rulers (e.g., Noynoy Aquino) will inherit the virtue of their respected ancestors and thus, lead the country to a better future.
Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha!
I thought the Philippines was beginning to shed its traditional notions of politics, which nations since the founding of recorded history had relentlessly subscribed into: that virtuous rule is passed down by blood; that, the key to the art of good governance is locked in the vaults of genetic breeding.
I am boggled, incensed, and struck by the incessant media attention given to a single person whose experience and knowledge of public governance is somewhat unknown and have been found wanting. I am currently checking the laws sponsored by this individual seeking the presidency, the decisions he has made, and the acts by which he became known for; so far, I have not found anything worthwhile to say when it comes to crediting him.
Only that he was the fortunate son of two revered statesmen.
Make no mistake. I am not advocating a rival presidential candidate. Mar Roxas is also a derivative product of traditional politics, a politician groomed and doomed to be shadowed by a father who was once a Philippine president.
The issue here, dear audience, is that again, through the focused exposure these blasted news networks, newspapers, and other media outlets have given a single individual's likelihood of deciding to become a potential presidential candidate, the Filipino people are being inundated with useless and irrelevant information detrimental to encouraging the rise of Filipinos as "informed citizens" vital to our democratic way of life.
Again, make no mistake. I do not advocate the regulation of the media because of its tendency to personalize what should have been issue-based!
I am merely criticizing its tendency to mix showbiz with the business of the state. Please don't be stupid enough to mix both or we'll end up with another convicted plunderer in the helm of the state.
Oops! Was that too obvious?
This happens when those who call themselves "journalists" try to please the people with "in" and profitable news: news that would likely titillate the audience than inform and provide the people with the necessary tools to wisely elect their representatives.
Even the media must be held accountable. No one, nothing is beyond reproach. Mind what you focus on telling; we, the gadflies, are always watching.
~
Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha!
Such naiveness deserves no less than the sting of reminding them, by hurtful words, that such person does not exist! "All fall short of His glory," as it is written.
Another vain fallacy that keeps me awake, short of laughing myself to the point of breathlessness, is the notion that the sons and daughters of proven benevolent rulers (e.g., Noynoy Aquino) will inherit the virtue of their respected ancestors and thus, lead the country to a better future.
Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha!
I thought the Philippines was beginning to shed its traditional notions of politics, which nations since the founding of recorded history had relentlessly subscribed into: that virtuous rule is passed down by blood; that, the key to the art of good governance is locked in the vaults of genetic breeding.
I am boggled, incensed, and struck by the incessant media attention given to a single person whose experience and knowledge of public governance is somewhat unknown and have been found wanting. I am currently checking the laws sponsored by this individual seeking the presidency, the decisions he has made, and the acts by which he became known for; so far, I have not found anything worthwhile to say when it comes to crediting him.
Only that he was the fortunate son of two revered statesmen.
Make no mistake. I am not advocating a rival presidential candidate. Mar Roxas is also a derivative product of traditional politics, a politician groomed and doomed to be shadowed by a father who was once a Philippine president.
The issue here, dear audience, is that again, through the focused exposure these blasted news networks, newspapers, and other media outlets have given a single individual's likelihood of deciding to become a potential presidential candidate, the Filipino people are being inundated with useless and irrelevant information detrimental to encouraging the rise of Filipinos as "informed citizens" vital to our democratic way of life.
Again, make no mistake. I do not advocate the regulation of the media because of its tendency to personalize what should have been issue-based!
I am merely criticizing its tendency to mix showbiz with the business of the state. Please don't be stupid enough to mix both or we'll end up with another convicted plunderer in the helm of the state.
Oops! Was that too obvious?
This happens when those who call themselves "journalists" try to please the people with "in" and profitable news: news that would likely titillate the audience than inform and provide the people with the necessary tools to wisely elect their representatives.
Even the media must be held accountable. No one, nothing is beyond reproach. Mind what you focus on telling; we, the gadflies, are always watching.
~
Friday, August 14, 2009
Slow Wheel of Justice - But it is Turning
Angono ex-treasurer, CoA rep jailed for missing P18-M fund
ANGONO, Rizal – The former municipal treasurer of this town and a Commission on Audit (CoA) employee are now in jail on charges of malversation of public funds.
Police said Municipal Treasurer Henrietta Miranda and Juanita Ajero-Bernadez, a CoA representative to this town, were arrested Wednesday night in Bloomingdale Subdivision, Barangay San Pedro.
The arrests were covered by a warrant issued by Judge Dennis Patrick Perez of the Fourth Judicial Region of the Binangonan Regional Trial Court for malversation of public funds charges under Criminal Case No. 09-329
Earlier, the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office found "prima facie evidence" against the suspects over some P18 million missing and unaccounted for from the municipal treasurer’s cash vault in December 2007.
National Bureau of Investigation records showed that the missing fund was discovered six months after Mayor Aurora Villamayor assumed her post.
The respondents executed their respective testimonies denying the charges against them. (Nel B. Andrade & F. T. Wakefield)
http://www.tempo.com.ph/news.php?aid=49446
ANGONO, Rizal – The former municipal treasurer of this town and a Commission on Audit (CoA) employee are now in jail on charges of malversation of public funds.
Police said Municipal Treasurer Henrietta Miranda and Juanita Ajero-Bernadez, a CoA representative to this town, were arrested Wednesday night in Bloomingdale Subdivision, Barangay San Pedro.
The arrests were covered by a warrant issued by Judge Dennis Patrick Perez of the Fourth Judicial Region of the Binangonan Regional Trial Court for malversation of public funds charges under Criminal Case No. 09-329
Earlier, the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office found "prima facie evidence" against the suspects over some P18 million missing and unaccounted for from the municipal treasurer’s cash vault in December 2007.
National Bureau of Investigation records showed that the missing fund was discovered six months after Mayor Aurora Villamayor assumed her post.
The respondents executed their respective testimonies denying the charges against them. (Nel B. Andrade & F. T. Wakefield)
http://www.tempo.com.ph/news.php?aid=49446
Saturday, August 1, 2009
The Commission on Appointments and Popular Legitimacy
In a democracy, certain officials of the state were granted the power to appoint officials in the name of practicality and expediency. Elected officials are mandated to nominate, confirm, and then appoint other officials because it is unthinkable for the whole citizenry to do so. Hence, representative democracy was born in modern times. However, the relationship between the pursuit of accountability and efficiency are quite inverse: the more wants to have accountability the more one should less expect quick decision making.
This is the dilemma at the heart of the Commission of Appointment. As demanded by accountability, thorough scrutiny of the bureaucracy, appointed officials, and government acts require extensive deliberations and considerable time on policymaking while smooth and quick implementation of public policies and confirmation of officials are necessary for the proper functioning of government. The compromise then was the creation of a special commission within the legislative branch, specifically tasked on approving nominations made by the chief executive.
But the problem with this commission is its exclusive nature. Even though half of the Senate is represented and an equal number is reserved for House members, the commission neither carry the popular and institutional legitimacy which the House or the Senate enjoys nor is it representative enough given that a commission with so few members represent the entire mandate of the people to confirm to their offices essential officers of the state.
The fact that in Philippine politics appointed officials frequently state that they were "serving under the leisure of the President" (thus, disregard legislative confirmation on the appointment of government officials ) serves to give notice to our legislators how limited the view of appointed officials regarding the appointment process; it also shows the importance of having either the upper or lower House, voting as a whole, to confirm the officers of the state and thus have a recognizable stake in their appointment.
Thus, in the name of legitimacy and expediency, I suggest transferring to a particular legislative branch, voting as a whole, which will have the least number of members (the Senate perhaps) in the amended 1987 Constitution the full responsibility of confirming nominated candidates. The trick here is persuading the other House that their powers will not diminish even if such House does not participate in confirming potential officers of the state. That such powers were only exclusively due to the speed which a single legislative body with fewer members can possibly provide, without having to sacrifice the institutional legitimacy it can confer, must be emphasized. Perhaps it should be also argued that the there are some powers that are exclusive to each House and such delegation was determined by their function, without prejudice to the co-equal essence of each house.
Or if the other House is not open to curtailing their confirming power, have the two Houses, voting as a whole, make the confirmation of nominated individuals a congressional priority, with a newly created appointment committees on each House making the crucial recommendation.
This is the dilemma at the heart of the Commission of Appointment. As demanded by accountability, thorough scrutiny of the bureaucracy, appointed officials, and government acts require extensive deliberations and considerable time on policymaking while smooth and quick implementation of public policies and confirmation of officials are necessary for the proper functioning of government. The compromise then was the creation of a special commission within the legislative branch, specifically tasked on approving nominations made by the chief executive.
But the problem with this commission is its exclusive nature. Even though half of the Senate is represented and an equal number is reserved for House members, the commission neither carry the popular and institutional legitimacy which the House or the Senate enjoys nor is it representative enough given that a commission with so few members represent the entire mandate of the people to confirm to their offices essential officers of the state.
The fact that in Philippine politics appointed officials frequently state that they were "serving under the leisure of the President" (thus, disregard legislative confirmation on the appointment of government officials ) serves to give notice to our legislators how limited the view of appointed officials regarding the appointment process; it also shows the importance of having either the upper or lower House, voting as a whole, to confirm the officers of the state and thus have a recognizable stake in their appointment.
Thus, in the name of legitimacy and expediency, I suggest transferring to a particular legislative branch, voting as a whole, which will have the least number of members (the Senate perhaps) in the amended 1987 Constitution the full responsibility of confirming nominated candidates. The trick here is persuading the other House that their powers will not diminish even if such House does not participate in confirming potential officers of the state. That such powers were only exclusively due to the speed which a single legislative body with fewer members can possibly provide, without having to sacrifice the institutional legitimacy it can confer, must be emphasized. Perhaps it should be also argued that the there are some powers that are exclusive to each House and such delegation was determined by their function, without prejudice to the co-equal essence of each house.
Or if the other House is not open to curtailing their confirming power, have the two Houses, voting as a whole, make the confirmation of nominated individuals a congressional priority, with a newly created appointment committees on each House making the crucial recommendation.
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Limits of Executive Privilege: Due Process Rules!
Executive privilege is exactly what it suggests - an executive's privilege, i.e., a privilege. The meaning of the word "privilege" suggests that the word is a benefit granted upon the assumption of office, not a right which absolves the holder of any wrongdoing in the eyes of the law. Indeed, one must emphasize that it is not a license to circumvent constitutional restrictions on governmental power but an waiver rarely used in order to fulfill a duty which requires substantial infringement of the social contract for the common good.
More so, executive privilege is and will always be subject to due process. Due process, if it is properly functioning, is capable of determining the need to temporarily allow a constitutional infringement for the common good. An impregnable executive privilege is tantamount to granting absolute power to hide abusive and ultra vires tendencies of governments, which history testifies as common.
The need for accountability and transparency ought to limit executive privilege when credible evidence suggests that such privilege is not being used to perform an essential official duty that requires constitutional infringement but for the advancement of personal gain.
Hence, the argument that executive privilege ought not to be questioned is unheard of in a liberal democracy, but is acceptable only in illiberal democracies or authoritarian regimes.
More so, executive privilege is and will always be subject to due process. Due process, if it is properly functioning, is capable of determining the need to temporarily allow a constitutional infringement for the common good. An impregnable executive privilege is tantamount to granting absolute power to hide abusive and ultra vires tendencies of governments, which history testifies as common.
The need for accountability and transparency ought to limit executive privilege when credible evidence suggests that such privilege is not being used to perform an essential official duty that requires constitutional infringement but for the advancement of personal gain.
Hence, the argument that executive privilege ought not to be questioned is unheard of in a liberal democracy, but is acceptable only in illiberal democracies or authoritarian regimes.
Monday, June 1, 2009
Borrowing Foreign Loans is a Power of the Purse, Dimwit
The Philippine Constitution empowers the chief executive to borrow foreign loans on behalf of the Republic "with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
Once again, one sees the extensive reach of the executive "power of the purse," enclosed in the supreme law of the land; only this time, instead of enclosed within an explicit description of public appropriation, the "power of the purse" is tucked within the capacity of the chief executive to ask foreign lenders credit in exchange for constitutionally protected "state secret" investment returns (the specifics of which, we will never know), thanks to executive privilege.
Yes, consent of the Monetary Board and limitations demanded by law, which Congress makes, provides a certain degree of accountability to executive borrowing. But given executive privilege, how is it possible for transparency to flourish under these current constitutional conditions?
Without congressional inquiry, lawmakers are unable to hold accountable the executive branch. Although the legislative branch may limit the chief executive through the laws it enacts, laws are insufficient checks to executive excesses (1) when they are neither updated nor tuned to limit the different approaches or new ways in which the chief executive do business with foreign lenders and thus get foreign loans; (2) lack of transparency allows no scrutiny of state concessions to foreign lenders; (3) and even if the chief executive is restrained by existing laws, Congress is not allowed to demand access to and scrutiny of executive agreements which may include foreign loans, an impasse which is shielded from congressional inquiry by virtue of executive privilege.
Let us not forget that accountability is only possible when transparency exists. Without congressional scrutiny and consent on executive agreements, laws that limits how and how much the chief executive borrows are useless.
As a result, I propose that a specific congressional resolution noting the limit and duration of such borrowing authority, with each house voting separately, is required before the chief executive is authorized, on behalf of the Republic, to borrow foreign loans.
The power of the purse is not limited to appropriations of funds found within the purse, but also funds that emanate outside the purse. The danger of delegating borrowing authority to a single officer of the state, with few or insufficient restraints, is a danger that can lead us not only to economic collapse, potential abuse and dire corruption, but also to the lost of our liberty to decide how our money is spent, whether be it for self-interest or the common good.
Once again, one sees the extensive reach of the executive "power of the purse," enclosed in the supreme law of the land; only this time, instead of enclosed within an explicit description of public appropriation, the "power of the purse" is tucked within the capacity of the chief executive to ask foreign lenders credit in exchange for constitutionally protected "state secret" investment returns (the specifics of which, we will never know), thanks to executive privilege.
Yes, consent of the Monetary Board and limitations demanded by law, which Congress makes, provides a certain degree of accountability to executive borrowing. But given executive privilege, how is it possible for transparency to flourish under these current constitutional conditions?
Without congressional inquiry, lawmakers are unable to hold accountable the executive branch. Although the legislative branch may limit the chief executive through the laws it enacts, laws are insufficient checks to executive excesses (1) when they are neither updated nor tuned to limit the different approaches or new ways in which the chief executive do business with foreign lenders and thus get foreign loans; (2) lack of transparency allows no scrutiny of state concessions to foreign lenders; (3) and even if the chief executive is restrained by existing laws, Congress is not allowed to demand access to and scrutiny of executive agreements which may include foreign loans, an impasse which is shielded from congressional inquiry by virtue of executive privilege.
Let us not forget that accountability is only possible when transparency exists. Without congressional scrutiny and consent on executive agreements, laws that limits how and how much the chief executive borrows are useless.
As a result, I propose that a specific congressional resolution noting the limit and duration of such borrowing authority, with each house voting separately, is required before the chief executive is authorized, on behalf of the Republic, to borrow foreign loans.
The power of the purse is not limited to appropriations of funds found within the purse, but also funds that emanate outside the purse. The danger of delegating borrowing authority to a single officer of the state, with few or insufficient restraints, is a danger that can lead us not only to economic collapse, potential abuse and dire corruption, but also to the lost of our liberty to decide how our money is spent, whether be it for self-interest or the common good.
Friday, May 1, 2009
Lack of Legislative Confirmation of the Ombudsman = 1987 Framers' Blunder
The Ombudsman and Lack of Legislative Confirmation
Here is another constitutional office whose "independence" is questionable.
Perhaps the intent of the 1987 framers was the creation of an investigative body beyond the influence and control of the three branches of government, having the sole power to prosecute and suspend alleged corrupt government officials.
The lack of legislative confirmation of the Office of the Ombudsman suggests that members of Congress, or those associated with or related to them, were amongst the targets of investigations by the Ombudsman, which can explain the need for an exclusive executive appointment, only constrained by qualification processes of the Judicial and Bar Council.
Indeed, the 1987 framers, in this sense, relied heavily on the chief executive to appoint an individual of outstanding capacity in order to fulfill the vital duties delegated to this office. Having in mind that giving members of the legislative branch confirming powers defeats the purpose of curtailing the powers of abusive and corrupt government officials within the legislative branch or those under their protection, the 1987 framers saw the necessity of weakening the system of checks and balances in favor of the chief executive, perhaps earnestly hoping on the people to elect a chief executive devoid of immoral and corrupt practices himself.
But what if the chief executive is himself, corrupt? How does the institutional mechanism within the Constitution address this problem? Given the array of exclusive prerogative granted to the chief executive, how can he be held accountable for his actions?
Line item veto ensures congressional indifference and incapacity; near absolute appointing powers enable the appointment of government officials who are beholden to, influenced by, and swear allegiance to the chief executive, rather than the Constitution; and appropriation powers of the chief executive is extensive to the point of the news media being accustomed to the Office of the President appropriating, giving, and releasing public money.
No doubt, the absence of legislative confirmation of the Ombudsman creates an imbalance within the system of checks and balances, leaving the chief executive with considerable institutional advantage vis-a-vis the national legislature.
The 1987 Framers' Blunder
This is where, I believe, the 1987 Framers failed in their wisdom.
By forgetting that the system of checks and balances through an equal separation of powers per se repairs institutional malfunction by fitting evil against evil, the 1987 framers relied too much on moral leadership to counter government excesses, ignoring what the American political philosopher/founding father/president, James Madison (who was also one of the architects of the U.S. federal system of government), meant when he said "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."
Indeed, the 1987 framers have determined that a powerful but benevolent ruler (in the form of a strong presidency) was the answer to the corruption that ever cripples the government in the eyes of the general public.
What baffles me regarding the subject of moral leadership is how did the 1987 framers come to the conclusion that an incorruptible individual, perhaps in the Platonic fashion, exists; more so, even if he does exist, I wonder whether the 1987 framers consider that our Constitution subscribes to the principle of rotation in office, a basic tenet of representative government, whose violation meant the destruction of democratic rule, and the beginning of tyranny?
Let us suppose that moral leadership is the answer to graft and corruption in the government. As previously stated, a tendency of benevolent rule is the concentration of power (in this case, the absence of legislative confirmation of the Ombudsman is a concentration of appointment powers) to a few (Judicial and Bar Council) and/or to a single person (the chief executive), capable of pursuing unadulterated altruism.
But even if moral leadership is effective to counter government abuses, the term of the chief executive is limited by constitutional restraint; hence, the million dollar question is: how could the chief executive exercise benevolent rule long after the Constitution so prohibits? Unfortunately, Aristotle's distinction between the ruled and the ruler is both a check against perpetual tyranny, and inseparably, perpetual benevolent rule.
As Arendt asserts, tyranny is not the suppression of liberty; but rather, the incapacitation of the people to govern themselves, or in a stricter sense, the drive to exclude each and any citizen of his membership in the public realm. Hence, by necessary implication, benevolent rule, where the concentration of power is inevitable, is the inseparable twin of tyranny.
Clearly, if one is to believe that "men are not angels," and societal ills are enduring, fixing government corruption through moral leadership only works when an incorruptible person exists; and he is allowed to rule in perpetuity. But make no mistake, I am not advocating virtuous rule at the expense of Aristotle's rotation principle. In our country, Marcos is an example enough to not rely on perpetual power, however morally endowed or meritoriously qualified a person is. I am merely suggesting that those who say that moral leadership is the answer to the corruption in a democratic government is sorely mistaken.
In a representative democracy, where the ruled and the ruler constantly rotate, moral leadership cannot replace in importance the concept that enables the branches of government to mind each other's business i.e., the system of checks and balances through equal separation of powers (hence, equal capacity to check each other's act), in order to lessen the ever present corruption that cripples government legitimacy and effectiveness in a much tolerable level: a level that promotes society's prosperity to posterity.
By giving too much power to the chief executive, there exists an unequal separation of powers; the system of checks and balances is inherently flawed, and ineffective to counter potential abuses by the chief executive because the Constitution itself is favorably leaning towards a strong presidency.
Here is another constitutional office whose "independence" is questionable.
Perhaps the intent of the 1987 framers was the creation of an investigative body beyond the influence and control of the three branches of government, having the sole power to prosecute and suspend alleged corrupt government officials.
The lack of legislative confirmation of the Office of the Ombudsman suggests that members of Congress, or those associated with or related to them, were amongst the targets of investigations by the Ombudsman, which can explain the need for an exclusive executive appointment, only constrained by qualification processes of the Judicial and Bar Council.
Indeed, the 1987 framers, in this sense, relied heavily on the chief executive to appoint an individual of outstanding capacity in order to fulfill the vital duties delegated to this office. Having in mind that giving members of the legislative branch confirming powers defeats the purpose of curtailing the powers of abusive and corrupt government officials within the legislative branch or those under their protection, the 1987 framers saw the necessity of weakening the system of checks and balances in favor of the chief executive, perhaps earnestly hoping on the people to elect a chief executive devoid of immoral and corrupt practices himself.
But what if the chief executive is himself, corrupt? How does the institutional mechanism within the Constitution address this problem? Given the array of exclusive prerogative granted to the chief executive, how can he be held accountable for his actions?
Line item veto ensures congressional indifference and incapacity; near absolute appointing powers enable the appointment of government officials who are beholden to, influenced by, and swear allegiance to the chief executive, rather than the Constitution; and appropriation powers of the chief executive is extensive to the point of the news media being accustomed to the Office of the President appropriating, giving, and releasing public money.
No doubt, the absence of legislative confirmation of the Ombudsman creates an imbalance within the system of checks and balances, leaving the chief executive with considerable institutional advantage vis-a-vis the national legislature.
The 1987 Framers' Blunder
This is where, I believe, the 1987 Framers failed in their wisdom.
By forgetting that the system of checks and balances through an equal separation of powers per se repairs institutional malfunction by fitting evil against evil, the 1987 framers relied too much on moral leadership to counter government excesses, ignoring what the American political philosopher/founding father/president, James Madison (who was also one of the architects of the U.S. federal system of government), meant when he said "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."
Indeed, the 1987 framers have determined that a powerful but benevolent ruler (in the form of a strong presidency) was the answer to the corruption that ever cripples the government in the eyes of the general public.
What baffles me regarding the subject of moral leadership is how did the 1987 framers come to the conclusion that an incorruptible individual, perhaps in the Platonic fashion, exists; more so, even if he does exist, I wonder whether the 1987 framers consider that our Constitution subscribes to the principle of rotation in office, a basic tenet of representative government, whose violation meant the destruction of democratic rule, and the beginning of tyranny?
Let us suppose that moral leadership is the answer to graft and corruption in the government. As previously stated, a tendency of benevolent rule is the concentration of power (in this case, the absence of legislative confirmation of the Ombudsman is a concentration of appointment powers) to a few (Judicial and Bar Council) and/or to a single person (the chief executive), capable of pursuing unadulterated altruism.
But even if moral leadership is effective to counter government abuses, the term of the chief executive is limited by constitutional restraint; hence, the million dollar question is: how could the chief executive exercise benevolent rule long after the Constitution so prohibits? Unfortunately, Aristotle's distinction between the ruled and the ruler is both a check against perpetual tyranny, and inseparably, perpetual benevolent rule.
As Arendt asserts, tyranny is not the suppression of liberty; but rather, the incapacitation of the people to govern themselves, or in a stricter sense, the drive to exclude each and any citizen of his membership in the public realm. Hence, by necessary implication, benevolent rule, where the concentration of power is inevitable, is the inseparable twin of tyranny.
Clearly, if one is to believe that "men are not angels," and societal ills are enduring, fixing government corruption through moral leadership only works when an incorruptible person exists; and he is allowed to rule in perpetuity. But make no mistake, I am not advocating virtuous rule at the expense of Aristotle's rotation principle. In our country, Marcos is an example enough to not rely on perpetual power, however morally endowed or meritoriously qualified a person is. I am merely suggesting that those who say that moral leadership is the answer to the corruption in a democratic government is sorely mistaken.
In a representative democracy, where the ruled and the ruler constantly rotate, moral leadership cannot replace in importance the concept that enables the branches of government to mind each other's business i.e., the system of checks and balances through equal separation of powers (hence, equal capacity to check each other's act), in order to lessen the ever present corruption that cripples government legitimacy and effectiveness in a much tolerable level: a level that promotes society's prosperity to posterity.
By giving too much power to the chief executive, there exists an unequal separation of powers; the system of checks and balances is inherently flawed, and ineffective to counter potential abuses by the chief executive because the Constitution itself is favorably leaning towards a strong presidency.
Monday, April 13, 2009
Line Item Veto Power favors a Strong Presidency; thus, it is Inimical to a Stable Federal Republic
One always wonder why appropriation of public funds requires de facto approval by the Philippine chief executive.
If we are to be reminded of the past, lawmakers were once called "tongressmen" for being morbidly corrupt. Virtuous rule by a statesmanlike figure such as former President Cory Aquino ensured that such lawmakers were kept under leash or so help us, they would spend public money like there is no tomorrow.
Unfortunately, her reign did not last, as provided for by the Philippine Constitution. Chief executives after her were accused of corruption while one even got convicted of plundering the nation's wealth.
Without a doubt, what was once an office that ensured adherence to the law has become the very office which became the source of patronage, corruption, and utter disregard for the rule of law.
Therefore, the time has come for the executive branch to be reined in.
If the executive branch is to be kept under leash, one must abolish or remove the constitutional power which perpetuate and reinforce executive dominance in terms of appropriating public funds.
That executive prerogative is called "line item veto."
In the hands of a chief executive that adheres to the rule of law, a line item veto is a tool to be reckoned with, especially in terms of legislative excesses. Nonetheless, in the hands of an ignoramus or a shrewd and corrupt chief executive, such power is extremely dangerous; indeed, line item veto had become the chief executive's threat to a particular legislator's pork barrel fund, a legislator whose crucial vote may determine the success of a pending bill beneficial to the chief executive.
If the line item veto is the chief executive's leash to a corrupt legislator's public spending, what on earth can hinder the chief executive from using such veto power to influence a fellow corrupt legislator from voting the chief executive's way? What constitutional restriction could stop a corrupt chief executive from threatening a particular legislator's (perhaps even legitimate) pet projects with a line item veto, unless the legislator kowtow to the chief executive's whim?
As of current, none.
Line item veto is an executive power that is beyond the reach of the system of checks and balances enshrined in the Philippine Constitution. The very essence of a line item veto power negates the use of (1) normal veto, (2) congressional 2/3 override of presidential veto (as explained by the long absence of (1) and (2) in congressional journals), and it (3) discourages other legislators from reconsidering the entire bill, as long as their proposed "line items" remain intact in the final draft.
It allows the rejection of hidden, unaccounted, and rushed appropriations; thus, it prevents abuse; but it also enables the rejection of clauses, or perhaps, even words that are vital to the interpretation and implementation of a bill, making the proposed bill "toothless" and thus, a watered down version.
Indeed, I dare say that line item veto is the most efficient form of the executive's power to check legislative excesses.
But the consequence of such efficiency is the very destruction of the separation of powers among the branches of government.
Fot it allows the chief executive to wield tremendous "power of the purse," that is, the power to micromanage the time and manner public money is spent. No wonder, the Philippine Media is used to the notion that the Office of the President or the Department of Budget and Management appropriates, gives, hands out or releases public funds. Hello! The key to the treasury is kept by Congress, if no one has noticed!
Indeed, such veto is a tool that, when used for good, can effectively check legislative misappropriation; but when used for bad, can slyly supersede accountability and transparency vital to a government under the rule of law.
For this reason, I propose that the line item veto power of the chief executive be stricken from the letter of the Philippine Constitution.
In consequence thereof, I also recommend the inclusion of a pocket veto in the amended charter, right before congressional adjournment or recess, to give additional flexibility to the chief executive and his ability to restrain what may be considered bad legislation.
One must also point out that the chief executive has not been completely disarmed by removing that specific kind of veto power. Normal veto remains intact, and it is sufficient to counter legislative abuses.
As an example, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Philippine Constitution is explicit in the sense that the previous year's budget appropriations can roll over to the next until a new appropriations bill is passed by Congress. If the legislative branch exceeded its appropriation authority (by going beyond the proposed budget of the chief executive (Philippine Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [1]), then the chief executive may use normal veto in order to fulfill his constitutional duty of checking legislative over-appropriation.
More so, the Constitution requires the chief executive to explain his "objections" to Congress (Article VI Section 27 [1], second sentence); perhaps, the best way to publicly rebuke those who proposed to increase the budget beyond congressional authority would be to explain as to why he objected, such as a lavish pork barrel spending.
If Congress insists that such legislation is passed, it is arguable that the chief executive can appeal to the public through the press before such legislation is passed over his veto, which in political lingo translates to a threat of failed incumbencies hanging over the heads of those legislators, leaving to the people to decide whether such legislation is appropriate in their judgment.
If we are to be reminded of the past, lawmakers were once called "tongressmen" for being morbidly corrupt. Virtuous rule by a statesmanlike figure such as former President Cory Aquino ensured that such lawmakers were kept under leash or so help us, they would spend public money like there is no tomorrow.
Unfortunately, her reign did not last, as provided for by the Philippine Constitution. Chief executives after her were accused of corruption while one even got convicted of plundering the nation's wealth.
Without a doubt, what was once an office that ensured adherence to the law has become the very office which became the source of patronage, corruption, and utter disregard for the rule of law.
Therefore, the time has come for the executive branch to be reined in.
If the executive branch is to be kept under leash, one must abolish or remove the constitutional power which perpetuate and reinforce executive dominance in terms of appropriating public funds.
That executive prerogative is called "line item veto."
In the hands of a chief executive that adheres to the rule of law, a line item veto is a tool to be reckoned with, especially in terms of legislative excesses. Nonetheless, in the hands of an ignoramus or a shrewd and corrupt chief executive, such power is extremely dangerous; indeed, line item veto had become the chief executive's threat to a particular legislator's pork barrel fund, a legislator whose crucial vote may determine the success of a pending bill beneficial to the chief executive.
If the line item veto is the chief executive's leash to a corrupt legislator's public spending, what on earth can hinder the chief executive from using such veto power to influence a fellow corrupt legislator from voting the chief executive's way? What constitutional restriction could stop a corrupt chief executive from threatening a particular legislator's (perhaps even legitimate) pet projects with a line item veto, unless the legislator kowtow to the chief executive's whim?
As of current, none.
Line item veto is an executive power that is beyond the reach of the system of checks and balances enshrined in the Philippine Constitution. The very essence of a line item veto power negates the use of (1) normal veto, (2) congressional 2/3 override of presidential veto (as explained by the long absence of (1) and (2) in congressional journals), and it (3) discourages other legislators from reconsidering the entire bill, as long as their proposed "line items" remain intact in the final draft.
It allows the rejection of hidden, unaccounted, and rushed appropriations; thus, it prevents abuse; but it also enables the rejection of clauses, or perhaps, even words that are vital to the interpretation and implementation of a bill, making the proposed bill "toothless" and thus, a watered down version.
Indeed, I dare say that line item veto is the most efficient form of the executive's power to check legislative excesses.
But the consequence of such efficiency is the very destruction of the separation of powers among the branches of government.
Fot it allows the chief executive to wield tremendous "power of the purse," that is, the power to micromanage the time and manner public money is spent. No wonder, the Philippine Media is used to the notion that the Office of the President or the Department of Budget and Management appropriates, gives, hands out or releases public funds. Hello! The key to the treasury is kept by Congress, if no one has noticed!
Indeed, such veto is a tool that, when used for good, can effectively check legislative misappropriation; but when used for bad, can slyly supersede accountability and transparency vital to a government under the rule of law.
For this reason, I propose that the line item veto power of the chief executive be stricken from the letter of the Philippine Constitution.
In consequence thereof, I also recommend the inclusion of a pocket veto in the amended charter, right before congressional adjournment or recess, to give additional flexibility to the chief executive and his ability to restrain what may be considered bad legislation.
One must also point out that the chief executive has not been completely disarmed by removing that specific kind of veto power. Normal veto remains intact, and it is sufficient to counter legislative abuses.
As an example, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Philippine Constitution is explicit in the sense that the previous year's budget appropriations can roll over to the next until a new appropriations bill is passed by Congress. If the legislative branch exceeded its appropriation authority (by going beyond the proposed budget of the chief executive (Philippine Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [1]), then the chief executive may use normal veto in order to fulfill his constitutional duty of checking legislative over-appropriation.
More so, the Constitution requires the chief executive to explain his "objections" to Congress (Article VI Section 27 [1], second sentence); perhaps, the best way to publicly rebuke those who proposed to increase the budget beyond congressional authority would be to explain as to why he objected, such as a lavish pork barrel spending.
If Congress insists that such legislation is passed, it is arguable that the chief executive can appeal to the public through the press before such legislation is passed over his veto, which in political lingo translates to a threat of failed incumbencies hanging over the heads of those legislators, leaving to the people to decide whether such legislation is appropriate in their judgment.
Friday, March 20, 2009
Judicial and Bar Council: Why Dissolve this Oligarchial Body
In the most exclusive and ex officio fashion, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is tasked by the Philippine Constitution to determine the qualification of potential candidates to the judiciary. The council is empowered to recommend and disqualify applicants based upon legal, moral, and merit qualifications. The purpose of such council is to abjudicate a candidate's qualification by virtue of the council's expertise, not by its representativeness or as a call it "democratic credentials."
This council represents the most elitist institution in the Philippine government. Membership is limited to the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, Justice Secretary, a retired Justice of the SC, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a law professor, and a "representative of the private sector -all of them non-elected officials and nominated by the chief executive. Although in the past, the council and its function may have been said as practical, its composition as a public institution is too undemocratic, and indeed, in a sense, oligarchial. Without a doubt, its inclusion in the 1987 Constitution is a step forward from the 1973 Constitution, which enabled the chief executive unlimited appointment powers.
But as a democratic polity, the Philippines deserves better.
Beholden to the chief appointing authority, this council, however morally endowed and meritoriously qualified, is outdated and must be abolished. Its credibility notwitstanding, the council lacks the legitimacy which a confirming authority such as the Commission on Appointments (CA) or the Philippine Senate can provide.
There is no de jure and de facto separation between executive and judicial appointments except that the CA confirms potential candidates in the executive branch while the judiciary are de facto confirmed by the JBC; hence, appointed members of the executive branch have more electoral legitimacy than members of the judiciary, while also noting that the CA's capacity to confer electoral legitimacy is also questionable.
Since the legislative branch does not participate on the confirmation of members of the SC, the Philippine Congress is virtually helpless in restraining the appointing powers of the chief executive. Unlike the system of checks and balances under the U.S. Constitution, the Philippine Constitution lacks a stable structure of checks and balances. Instead, it relies on appointed constitutionally-created commissions, such as the JBC, to function as constitutionally-empowered but supposedly politically-neutral government institutions to restrain the three great departments of government.
Although the Philippine Congress exercises the power to remove impeachable officials, it does not have the authority to prevent the appointment of an unworthy appointee; and yet the ability to prevent "engot" appointments are as much important, if not more, as having the capacity to remove "engot" appointments. Stop gangrene at its root.
Indeed, the 1987 framers tend to dismiss the principle of limited power through the necessary affirmation of actions of a branch of government by another branch of government (appropriations, passage, execution or constitutionality of laws, etc) insofar as appointments of public officials are concerned. To the 1987 framers, clashes of opposing interests (or "ambitions" as Madison puts it) between the two most politically inclined branches of the goverment (the executive and the legislative branch) are unreliable to produce public good (that is, recruit worthy citizen-bar members to the judiciary) and may only be applicable to a mature and informed polity.
The argument that the appointment of SC Justices as being politicized when confirmed by a legislative body (CA or the Senate) is inconsistent and baloney; the appointment of SC Justices is and has always been a political process; it is political because the people must have some say regarding magistrates who shall judge fairly among themselves; more so, it is very political because without the appointment of the chief executive, it is impossible for the Judicial Department to exist, if one has not noticed!
Indeed, how can the judiciary escape the taint of political appointment if the appointing authority is already tainted?
The dilemma lies on the 1987 framers' premise to rely on the person's personal pursuit of common good, instead of strengthening the institutional processes geared towards the common good.
As it is said, politics in the Philippines is too personal. Processes (e.g., due process), whether be it political or legal, are merely a formality that in a culture of "palusot," are usually circumvented.
After all, why do we need due process, if we have benevolent leaders for us to follow?
Sunud-sunurang engot.
Lastly, for JBC to continue in its duty meant that the Filipino people is not yet ready to hold accountable and have a say on who shall judge over them, at least through legislators that act as representatives that confirm magistrates of justice.
~
This council represents the most elitist institution in the Philippine government. Membership is limited to the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, Justice Secretary, a retired Justice of the SC, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a law professor, and a "representative of the private sector -all of them non-elected officials and nominated by the chief executive. Although in the past, the council and its function may have been said as practical, its composition as a public institution is too undemocratic, and indeed, in a sense, oligarchial. Without a doubt, its inclusion in the 1987 Constitution is a step forward from the 1973 Constitution, which enabled the chief executive unlimited appointment powers.
But as a democratic polity, the Philippines deserves better.
Beholden to the chief appointing authority, this council, however morally endowed and meritoriously qualified, is outdated and must be abolished. Its credibility notwitstanding, the council lacks the legitimacy which a confirming authority such as the Commission on Appointments (CA) or the Philippine Senate can provide.
There is no de jure and de facto separation between executive and judicial appointments except that the CA confirms potential candidates in the executive branch while the judiciary are de facto confirmed by the JBC; hence, appointed members of the executive branch have more electoral legitimacy than members of the judiciary, while also noting that the CA's capacity to confer electoral legitimacy is also questionable.
Since the legislative branch does not participate on the confirmation of members of the SC, the Philippine Congress is virtually helpless in restraining the appointing powers of the chief executive. Unlike the system of checks and balances under the U.S. Constitution, the Philippine Constitution lacks a stable structure of checks and balances. Instead, it relies on appointed constitutionally-created commissions, such as the JBC, to function as constitutionally-empowered but supposedly politically-neutral government institutions to restrain the three great departments of government.
Although the Philippine Congress exercises the power to remove impeachable officials, it does not have the authority to prevent the appointment of an unworthy appointee; and yet the ability to prevent "engot" appointments are as much important, if not more, as having the capacity to remove "engot" appointments. Stop gangrene at its root.
Indeed, the 1987 framers tend to dismiss the principle of limited power through the necessary affirmation of actions of a branch of government by another branch of government (appropriations, passage, execution or constitutionality of laws, etc) insofar as appointments of public officials are concerned. To the 1987 framers, clashes of opposing interests (or "ambitions" as Madison puts it) between the two most politically inclined branches of the goverment (the executive and the legislative branch) are unreliable to produce public good (that is, recruit worthy citizen-bar members to the judiciary) and may only be applicable to a mature and informed polity.
The argument that the appointment of SC Justices as being politicized when confirmed by a legislative body (CA or the Senate) is inconsistent and baloney; the appointment of SC Justices is and has always been a political process; it is political because the people must have some say regarding magistrates who shall judge fairly among themselves; more so, it is very political because without the appointment of the chief executive, it is impossible for the Judicial Department to exist, if one has not noticed!
Indeed, how can the judiciary escape the taint of political appointment if the appointing authority is already tainted?
The dilemma lies on the 1987 framers' premise to rely on the person's personal pursuit of common good, instead of strengthening the institutional processes geared towards the common good.
As it is said, politics in the Philippines is too personal. Processes (e.g., due process), whether be it political or legal, are merely a formality that in a culture of "palusot," are usually circumvented.
After all, why do we need due process, if we have benevolent leaders for us to follow?
Sunud-sunurang engot.
Lastly, for JBC to continue in its duty meant that the Filipino people is not yet ready to hold accountable and have a say on who shall judge over them, at least through legislators that act as representatives that confirm magistrates of justice.
~
Friday, February 13, 2009
Rommel Aberia
PAKIUSAP, PAKITANGGAL YUNG PICTURE NA HINDI SA IYO SA FRIENDSTER ACCOUNT MO.
MGA KAPATID, PAMANGKIN, AT PINSAN KO SILA.
ETO ANG WEBSITE NYA.
http://profiles.friendster.com/65566554
MGA KAPATID, PAMANGKIN, AT PINSAN KO SILA.
ETO ANG WEBSITE NYA.
http://profiles.friendster.com/65566554
Friday, January 30, 2009
Journalists, Beware of How You Tell the Story; Heavy Editing Creates Misconception and Misinformation
All it takes is a wrong impression.
In pursuit of finding the most appropriate words while minding the cost of space every character in an article creates, one must not sacrifice accuracy and the full conveyance of meaning, in the altar of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
For those not versed in the notion of executive orders (EO), executive orders are directives from the chief executive, emanating from his constitutional duty to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed" (Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Section 18).
Indeed, executive orders are written commands of the chief executive to the executive branch in order to fulfill their role as executors of the law, not as alterers, amenders, or modifiers of the law; as the Philippine Constitution gives the chief executive "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," it is necessary for the chief executive to give final direction when overlapping boundaries of duty creates confusion and discord within the executive branch.
It is quite absurd for anyone to think that executive orders or even decisions/findings of committees created by the chief executive can supersede Acts of Congress, given that the notion of executive orders are subordinately tied to the execution of laws, which are also called congressional acts (i.e., laws = congressional acts). Unless specified by law, which Congress makes (i.e., allowed by congressional acts) or by constitutional mandate, executive orders has no bearing when it comes to other branches of government, i.e., Congress and the Supreme Court.
Hence, it is fallacy to say that a mere executive order can amend the ARMM law, not to mention the law is an organic act in itself. Although I highly doubt that the author of the article meant what I have just stated, it is expected of journalists to write articles that reflect accuracy based on facts, to help their fellow citizens make informed decisions.
Perhaps, emphasis on the creation of a committee that would RECOMMEND changes to the ARMM law would be more appropriate, don't you think?
In pursuit of finding the most appropriate words while minding the cost of space every character in an article creates, one must not sacrifice accuracy and the full conveyance of meaning, in the altar of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
For those not versed in the notion of executive orders (EO), executive orders are directives from the chief executive, emanating from his constitutional duty to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed" (Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Section 18).
Indeed, executive orders are written commands of the chief executive to the executive branch in order to fulfill their role as executors of the law, not as alterers, amenders, or modifiers of the law; as the Philippine Constitution gives the chief executive "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," it is necessary for the chief executive to give final direction when overlapping boundaries of duty creates confusion and discord within the executive branch.
It is quite absurd for anyone to think that executive orders or even decisions/findings of committees created by the chief executive can supersede Acts of Congress, given that the notion of executive orders are subordinately tied to the execution of laws, which are also called congressional acts (i.e., laws = congressional acts). Unless specified by law, which Congress makes (i.e., allowed by congressional acts) or by constitutional mandate, executive orders has no bearing when it comes to other branches of government, i.e., Congress and the Supreme Court.
Hence, it is fallacy to say that a mere executive order can amend the ARMM law, not to mention the law is an organic act in itself. Although I highly doubt that the author of the article meant what I have just stated, it is expected of journalists to write articles that reflect accuracy based on facts, to help their fellow citizens make informed decisions.
Perhaps, emphasis on the creation of a committee that would RECOMMEND changes to the ARMM law would be more appropriate, don't you think?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
.png)